27 April / 2022

About the special military operation in Ukraine

1.1. "Russia (like all other states) consistently defends its sovereign right to implement its own domestic and foreign policy.

The strategic goal of Russia's domestic policy at the present historical stage is to ensure sustainable, predictable and crisis-free development of the state and society.

As world historical practice shows, the creating of well-balanced mechanisms and institutions of state and social life arrangements is a naturalistic and long process. It runs through the evolution of people’s political and legal consciousness shaping, political culture development, essential increase of individual and public responsibility of citizens and self-organization of society.

Artificial (internal or external) intrusion of "universal" democratic values to society, a "leap" through the natural stages of socio-political development lead to internal shocks and conflicts associated with economic stagnation and often with bloodshed. Russia no longer needs revolutionary upheavals. (Negative historical examples, the repetition of which Russia is trying to avoid: the situation in most post-Soviet countries, including Russia, in the late 1980s and 1990s, the "Arab Spring", current situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan)".

1.2. "Russia's national interests in the post-Soviet space include the necessity to maintain good-neighborly friendly relations with all post-Soviet states, support their internal political stability and economic prosperity.

Socio-political destabilization or economic stagnation in the border states pose significant risks to the security, internal political and economic stability in Russia.

We understand that such destabilization, as a rule, follows with the attempts to implement ways of organizing state and social life from outside. Russia consistently defends the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Russia has never staged "color" revolutions and, unlike Western countries, does not put forward domestic political demands to other states as conditions for cooperation.

Russia's foreign policy in the post-Soviet space proceeds from the need to preserve mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation that is based on historical economic ties between our countries (that extremely important for economies of developing countries). We are interested in maintaining cultural fellowship, positive and respectful relations between people of our countries as well as extension of communication between citizens of our states."

1.3. "Russia proceeds from the prevailing geopolitical realities, the absence of political, economic and social prerequisites for the restoration of the USSR.

Russia has not had and does not have territorial claims to other post-Soviet states.

The annexation of Crimea is not the result of Russia's foreign policy; it is a consequence of the internal political struggle (violent coup d'etat) in Ukraine and the real threat of genocide of the Russian-speaking population of Crimea. Moreover, the implementation of the new "Maidan" Ukrainian authorities’ ambitions to go into NATO would inevitably lead to the transformation of the Crimean Peninsula into a powerful NATO naval outpost. Taking into account the same aspirations of Georgia and the NATO membership of Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, further developments could allow NATO to ensure its complete dominance in the Black Sea region and would create significant threats to Russia's security. These threats to the residents of Crimea and to Russia have led to the necessity to support the Crimeans and create conditions for their free self-determination.

The conflict in the South-East of Ukraine is caused by the same reasons. For 8 years, Russia has consistently advocated an early settlement of the conflict on the basis of the Minsk Agreements, which provided the residents of Donbass with minimal security guarantees.

The 2008 conflict in South Ossetia was caused by gross violations of international law by the Georgian side, which did not provide proper conditions for the Russian peacekeeping contingent that was acting legally - a direct attack was carried out.

Russia plays a key role in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, preventing bloodshed and civil war in Kazakhstan, provides substantial economic and military technical assistance to ensure the security of the Central Asian states in connection with the events in Afghanistan."

1.4. "Unlike Russia, Western countries, bypassing the UN Charter, have always allowed themselves to initiate various restrictions and sanctions at their own discretion, as well as to introduce troops and conduct military operations on the territory of other states.

In 1999, NATO led by the United States, without the sanction of the UN Security Council, carried out a military operation - 11 weeks of "carpet bombing" of the former Yugoslavia.

In 2003, the United States and its allies invaded Iraq, officially American troops were withdrawn only in 2011, and in 2006 they "organized" the execution of the president of Iraq.

In 2014, the military intervention of the United States and its allies in Syria without the consent of the Syrian government and the sanctions of the UN Security Council".

1.5. "The United States and its Western allies, despite the obvious failures and the generally recognized extremely negative consequences of the policy of "promoting democracy" in other regions of the world (in North Africa, the Middle East, Ukraine, Afghanistan) continue the same strategy concerning Russia and other post-Soviet states.

The United States, Canada, the EU, EU states separately and NATO member states annually allocate about $1 billion and 1.5 billion euros to finance the activities of non-government organizations (NGOs) and the media in Russia and other post-Soviet states. In 2020, more than 2 thousand organizations of this kind carried out their activities with the direct support of these states. All efforts were aimed to discredit the "objectionable" authorities and political forces of states that conduct independent domestic and foreign policy; to promote their own political and moral values without taking into account the level of development of political institutions, cultural and religious traditions and values of these states. There are many facts of financial support for various extremist political and religious organizations. The obvious consequence of this "work" is the inevitable destabilization of the socio-political and economic situation in these states and creation of a "belt of instability" around Russia (examples: Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Kazakhstan)."

1.6. "Activities aimed at destabilizing the socio-political situation in these countries are combined with the aggressive approach of the US and NATO military infrastructure to the borders of Russia in order to dictate to us their rules of conduct within the country and in relations with other states "at the sight of missiles".

For reference: On May 27, 1997, the Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed. It fixed the refusal to consider each other as opponents. At that time, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were not part of NATO.

In violation of these promises and the principle of indivisibility of security, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were admitted to NATO in 1999, and Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia were admitted in 2004. In 2009 - Albania and Croatia. In 2017 - Montenegro and in 2020 - Northern Macedonia.

In 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems, in 2019 — from the Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Medium-range and Shorter-range Missiles, in 2020 the Open Skies Treaty.

From 2007 to 2016 on the eastern borders of NATO (in Romania and Poland) The United States has deployed a missile defense system, the installations of which allow launching offensive Tomahawk missiles on the territory of the Russian Federation.

In 2008, Georgia and Ukraine were chosen as springboards for further military and political pressure on Russia, who were promised the possibility of obtaining membership in the Alliance in the future at the NATO summit in Bucharest."

1.7. "Russia offered the United States and NATO to arrange equitable written agreement on of global security issues.

In December 2021, Russia prepared and submitted the relevant draft agreements Russia-USA and Russia-NATO.

These Russian proposals for providing legal security guarantees, including non-expansion of the Alliance to the East, the returning of its military infrastructure to the configuration of 1997, when the Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed, were ignored. The global escalation has continued."

II. The direct reasons for the special military operation

2.1. "After supporting the coup d'etat in Ukraine in February 2014, the United States and European countries pursued their own aggressive policy towards Russia, cynically using Ukraine as a tool to achieve their geopolitical goals.

A large-scale militarization of Ukraine has begun, and the encouragement of radical neo-Nazi sentiments in Ukrainian society has been intensified. The Ukrainian authorities have activated the process of glorification of fascists’ collaborators followed with torchlight processions in honor of war criminals. Stepan Bandera was declared a national hero."

2.2. "Russia was ready to provide full support to V. Zelensky in fulfilling his election promises to restore peace in Ukraine. However, he deceived Ukraine, Russia and the world community by continuing and even surpassing policy of P. Poroshenko to connivance and encouragement of nationalist, neo-fascist, militaristic ideology.

Despite of anti-Russian, nationalist and militaristic ideology imposition, the presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2019 showed that this ideology is rejected by the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians.

In April 2019, before the second round of elections, representatives of V. Zelensky got in touch with representatives of Russia. They suggested to resolve the conflict in the Donbas in full compliance with the Minsk Agreements and restore relations between Ukraine and Russia as soon as V. Zelensky becomes a president (it was supposed to cancel mutual trade restrictions, restore air traffic, even water supply to the Crimea).

As part of the advisory assistance, Russia prepared several versions of Roadmaps, which, with the general declarative support of the Ukrainian leadership, were distorted and filled with opposite meanings and contents during their revision.

Adherence to the Minsk agreements turned out to be a bluff. The restoration of relations with Russia was forgotten. In November 2019, bilateral cooperation on this topic was curtailed. Ukraine's relations with Russia and the process of resolving the conflict in the Donbas continued to degrade."

2.3. "For 8 years, the new Ukrainian "authorities" have openly demonstrated their interest in maintaining the conflict in a "semi-hot phase" as well as unwillingness to return Donbass to the Ukrainian political, economic and legal space. The lives and sufferings of Ukrainian citizens on both sides of the contact line were not taken into account.

The Minsk agreements were sabotaged, the ceasefire obligations were not fulfilled, the negotiation process was delayed under far-fetched absurd pretexts. Any proposals by representatives of Donbass on the peaceful end of the conflict were frankly ignored by Ukraine. Kiev refused to give either a positive or negative answer to them.

The reasons and goals of such policy were clear, first by the team of P. Poroshenko, and then by V. Zelensky.:

1) under the pretext of "war", the retention of power with evasion of responsibility for fulfilling obligations to the citizens of Ukraine and Western sponsors to carry out socio-economic and political transformations, with the exclusion of pro-Russian residents of Donbass from the political life of Ukraine, as well as with the persecution of opposition media and political opponents;

2) asking for financial and other material support from Western states to counteract Russia- the "aggressor";

3) lack of resources to restore the destroyed industrial and social infrastructure of Donbass and unwillingness to bear political responsibility for solving this problem;

4) inflicting maximum political and economic damage to Russia through the sanctions pressure and maintaining the problem of spending on humanitarian support for the residents of Donbass.

For reference: Ukrainian officials, including V. Zelensky, in their public statements claimed that the Minsk agreements are a "noose around Ukraine's neck" that are necessary only to maintain sanctions against Russia. The head of the Ukrainian delegation to the Contact Group even called Donbass a "cancerous tumor" for Ukraine, "which needs to be cut off."

2.4. "The United States and its allies opposed the settlement of the conflict in the Donbas and actively encouraged Kiev's policy of confrontation with Russia.

In 2019 Germany and France, which are members of the Normandy format, expressed their indignation by the attempts of Russia and Ukraine to work out solutions to normalize relations between our countries and implement the Minsk Agreements in order to resolve the conflict in the Donbas on a bilateral basis (through unofficial channels) (see paragraph 2.2.).

In March 2020, they refused to support and practically "torpedoed" the agreement reached in the Contact Group on the establishment of an Advisory Council as a platform for dialogue between representatives of Ukraine and Donbass on the settlement of the conflict.

Western states have always on public "exposed" Russia as a party to the conflict that is absolutely groundless, contrary to the spirit and letter of the Minsk agreements. The United States, Germany, France and Ukraine have never been able to formulate any of Russia's obligations under these agreements. In September 2021, Germany and France "agreed" to the point that they proposed "let Russia come up with its own obligations."

For 8 years, Western countries did not notice facts of genocide in Donbass carried out by Kiev as through the use of shelling and the economic blockade of this region."

2.5. "Ukraine's entry to NATO with the background of non-recognition of Crimea's secession from Ukraine and the unresolved conflict in the Donbas would mean an automatic declaration of war between NATO and Russia for Crimea, as well as the use of NATO armed forces in the Donbas to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Despite this obvious threat of the 3rd World War, Ukraine has significantly intensified its efforts to join NATO in 2021."

For reference: NATO countries have been "pumping" Ukraine with weapons for all 8 years and training the Ukrainian army with foreign instructors, turning it into a springboard of a constant threat to Russia. NATO military exercises were continuously conducted near the Russian borders. Nine of them were planned for 2022 on the territory of Ukraine.

"The United States and other NATO member states, instead of reaching concrete agreements to ensure mutual security on the "eastern flank" of NATO, proclaimed a far-fetched principle of "open doors" that is not written in any NATO documents.

2.6. "Russia was ready for various compromises in order to provide an opportunity to "save face" for Western politicians after their absolutely irresponsible statements.

However, in response, there was a "double game", outright deception, tactics of "blurting out", substitution of concrete decisions with endless bureaucratic negotiations with the obvious goal of "buying time" for the further militarization of Ukraine.

In the absence of concrete counter-arguments and proposals regarding the settlement of the conflict in the Donbas and Russian security concerns, the "democratic" USA, France, Germany, and Ukraine have consistently insisted on the "confidentiality" of negotiations, and even officially proposed to adhere to the principle of "constructive ambiguity" on key issues of the proposed agreements.

It is known that, at the talks in Moscow in early February 2022, E. Macron agreed to convince V. Zelensky that Ukraine should independently assume obligations under a neutral demilitarized status so that NATO member states would not have to publicly abandon the "open doors" principle advertised by them. However, as it turned out (according to information from the Office of the President of Ukraine), he did not even bring this position to V. Zelensky.

After allegedly searching for compromises during the "conciliatory" talks in Moscow and Kiev on February 07 and 08, 2022 by E. Macron, February 14 and 15, 2022 by O. Scholz, February 12, 2022 by telephone talks by J. Biden, V. Zelensky at the Munich Conference on February 19, 2022 announced the possibility of Ukraine's withdrawal from the Budapest Memorandum which is equivalent to claims to acquire their own nuclear weapons."

III.      Consequences of the operation

3.1. "The main aims of the special military operation are the protection of the DPR and LPR, forcing Ukraine to a neutral status, demilitarization and denazification of its state and social life, elimination of threats to Russia emanating from Ukrainian territory due to its development by NATO countries. The operation is not directed against the people of Ukraine.

The main aims of the special operation in Ukraine are:

1) the consolidation in the Constitution of Ukraine of the new outlines of the country's border (without Crimea, the DPR and the LPR), the permanent neutral status of Ukraine, implying the refusal to participate in any military alliances and a prohibition on the deployment of any foreign military bases on its territory;

2) demilitarization, which provides for a significant reduction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a prohibition on the possession of nuclear weapons, offensive weapons and military infrastructure that poses a potential military threat to neighboring states;

3) denazification, the result of which should be the eradication of any neo-Nazi, misanthropic and discriminatory ideology against any groups of citizens by nationality or other feature, which should be enshrined in the permanent legislation of the country. Moreover, discriminatory laws that have already been adopted should be repealed, nationalist associations should be prohibited, and should be lustrated.

After the conclusion of the peace treaty with the current authorities of Ukraine and after completing the tasks of the special operation, hostilities will immediately cease, and Russian troops will be withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine after the completion of internal procedures ensuring a neutral and demilitarized status.

If the Ukrainian authorities refuse to conclude a peace agreement on the above conditions and continue armed resistance after the completion of the operation, in Ukraine and in its regions will be formed temporary civilian military administrations to achieve the designated tasks, whose tasks will be the full restoration of peaceful life in Ukraine, the formation of state authorities and local government via democratic elections."

3.2. "The plan of the USA and Western countries on the international isolation of Russia hasn’t worked.

The Western countries are making active efforts to "attract" as many states as possible into their sanctions policy. Despite the unprecedented pressure, only 41 States with a total population of about 1.2 billion people joined the sanctions. Among them, first of all, the states of North America and Europe, as well as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Of the 197 independent states (193 of which are UN members) with a combined population of about 7.9 billion people, sanctions are not supported by 80% of the countries in which 85% of the world's population lives and which account for 56.9% of world GDP (according to the International Monetary Fund).

Maintaining trade and economic relations with the vast majority of countries in the world will allow Russia and its partners in the EAEU and the CIS to overcome Western sanctions restrictions on the export and import of goods and services."

3.3. "The economic potential accumulated over the past decades of socio-political stability, industrial and food independence of Russia will allow the Russian economy to adapt to new conditions in a short time.

Russia has the largest mineral reserves in the world. Russia ranks first in terms of proven natural gas reserves (38,000 billion cubic meters. m), the sixth place in proven oil reserves (14700 million tons, 2020). Russia accounts for about 17% of the world's natural gas production, Russia ranks third in the world in oil production and sixth in coal and lignite production. Russia ranks fourth in the world in terms of electricity production (1085 billion kWh, 2020).

Russia is among the world's industrial leaders in the production of cast iron (51.2 million tons, 2020, 4th place in the world) and steel (71.6 million tons, 2020, 5th place in the world), paper and cardboard (9.1 million tons, 2020, 13th place in the world), produces about 10% the world volume of mineral fertilizers (23 million tons, 2020).

68.5% of Russian industrial (non-primary) products in terms of price and quality successfully compete in world markets and are sold for export.

Russia is among the leading countries in the production of certain types of agricultural products: grain and leguminous crops (133 million tons, 2020, 5th place in the world), potatoes (30.6 million tons, 2020, 3rd place in the world), livestock and poultry for slaughter (15.6 million tons, 2020, 4th place in the world), milk (32.4 million tons, 2020, 6th place in the world).

Russia produces about 10% of the world's wheat (72.1 million tons, 2018), about 25% of sunflower (12.8 million tons, 2018), 15% of sugar beet (42.1 million tons, 2020)

The creation of a common labor market with Russia within the framework of the EAEU provides economic and political stability to neighboring countries. Partners get the opportunity to export excess labor to Russia, reducing socio-political tensions and receiving a significant increase in GDP in the form of remittances.

The average salary in Russia exceeds similar indicators of other EAEU countries. The average salary in Russia in 2021 was $ 764, (at the rate of 73.6 rubles per 1 US dollar) (in Belarus - $ 522, in Kazakhstan - $ 485, in Armenia - $ 380, in Kyrgyzstan - $ 246)."

3.4. "Sanctions against Russia open up new opportunities for the member states of the free trade zone of the EAEU and the CIS.

The withdrawal of Western companies and restrictions on imports to Russia open up a capacious Russian market for manufacturers of relevant goods and services of these states.

The termination of the implementation of investment and infrastructure projects in the countries of the European Union makes it possible to reorient resources for the implementation of such projects in the post-Soviet countries.

Russia has no plans to stop working on existing and planned joint projects in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

All of them will be implemented including industrial cooperation, healthcare, innovation and scientific and technical cooperation, education advanced training and other fields.

Russia will fundamentally increase imports from the post-Soviet states, ensuring the replacement of supplies from "unfriendly countries".

3.5. "The geopolitical rapprochement between Russia and China creates long-term opportunities for the stable development of Central Asian countries and a predictable situation for local businesses.

3.6. "Russia will expand the practice of payments in Russian rubles on loans and energy supplies for the post-Soviet states.

During 2013-2021, the Russian ruble, which acquired a developed settlement infrastructure and a capacious market of financial instruments, steadily increased its position as a payment currency. The regional status of the Russian ruble, which plays an important role in servicing trade transactions, is confirmed by a steady increase in its weight in settlements, primarily between Russia's trading partners in the EAEU. Only in 2013-2019, the share of the Russian currency in the structure of export payments increased from 53.8 to 69.8%, and in import payments - from 60.7 to 75.3%.

The transition to Russian energy trade for rubles significantly reduces the price of energy for importers, especially for Belarus, for which, in particular, the preservation of the gas price supplies at the level of 2021 (128.5 US dollars per 1 thousand cubic meters at a fixed rate of 75 rubles per 1 US dollar) provides the benefits for the national economy for about 0.5 billion US dollars per year according to official Belarusian estimates.

3.7. "Thanks to Russia, the process of changing the unfair world order, de-dollarization has begun, the formation of a multipolar world is being completed.

Not every country is ready to put the well-being of their citizens at risk at the behest of the United States and Great Britain.

Having significant influence in the world, Russia consistently opposes the hegemony of individual countries and supports the principles of a multipolar world order."